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We study the role of unbiased migration in cooperation in the framework of spatial evolutionary
game on a variety of spatial structures, involving regular lattice, continuous plane and complex
networks. A striking finding is that migration plays a universal role in cooperation, regardless of
the spatial structures. For high degree of migration, cooperators cannot survive due to the failure
of forming cooperator clusters to resist attacks of defectors. While for low degree of migration,
cooperation is considerably enhanced compared to statically spatial game, which is due to the
strengthening of the boundary of cooperator clusters by the occasionally accumulation of cooperators
along the boundary. The cooperator cluster thus becomes more robust than that in static game
and defectors nearby the boundary can be assimilated by cooperators, so the cooperator cluster
expands, which facilitates cooperation. The general role of migration will be substantiated by
sufficient simulations associated with heuristic explanations.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
Cooperation is fundamental to biological and social
systems. Understanding factors that facilitate and ham-
per cooperation is a significant issue. In the framework
of evolutionary games, a number of mechanisms in favor
of cooperation have been found, such as costly punish-
ment [1, 2], reputation [3, 4] and social diversity [5–7].
Quite recently, the role of migration in cooperative be-
havior has drawn growing interests [8–13], because of the
fact that migration is a common feature in nature and
society. For example, millions of animals migrate in the
savannas of Africa every year, and thousands of people
travel among different countries every day. In this regard,
Vainstein et al. [10] considered a scenario that individu-
als can move to neighboring sites on a two-dimensional
lattice randomly with some probability. In particular, it
is found that such movement can maintain and even en-
hance cooperation compared to the absence of migration.
More recently, Meloni et al. studied evolutionary games
composed of mobile players on a continuous plane [13].
Their results showed that cooperation can survive pro-
vided that both the temptation to defect and the veloc-
ity at which individuals move are not too high. Beyond
random migration, Helbing and Yu proposed a success-
driven migration strategy which is spurred by the pursuit
of profit as a nature of individuals [11]. Specifically, indi-
viduals tend to move to neighboring site with the highest
estimated payoffs. Interestingly, such migration results in
the outbreak of cooperation in a noisy environment.
Although it has been demonstrated that migration can
promote cooperation in evolutionary games on some reg-
ular spatial structures [10, 12], the role of migration on
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other kinds of structures, for instance, complex networks,
is unknown yet. A natural concern is then whether mi-
gration plays some general role in cooperation, regard-
less of underlying structures, or there exists dependence
of the role of migration on structures? To address this
issue, in this paper we incorporate random migration in
evolutionary games on a variety of spatial structures, in-
volving continuous space, regular structure, and typical
complex topologies. Strikingly, we find that the role of
random migration in promoting cooperation is universal,
regardless of different structures. This is somewhat coun-
terintuitive in the sense that mobility of individuals may
weaken the stability of cooperation clusters which are key
for the survival of cooperators. However, we will sub-
stantiate the positive effect of random migration on co-
operation by intensive simulations and provide convinced
explanations for the underlying mechanisms.
To be concrete, we use the Prisoner’s Dilemma [14]
to carry out our researches. In principle, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma is a game played by two players, each of whom
chooses one of two strategies, cooperation or defection.
They both receive payoffR upon mutual cooperation and
P upon mutual defection. If one defects while the other
cooperates, cooperator receives S while defector gets T .
The ranking of the four payoff values is: T > R > P > S.
Thus in a single round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma it
is best to defect regardless of the opponent’s decision.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has attracted much attention in
theoretical and experimental studies of cooperative be-
havior. Following common practice [15], we set T = b
(1 < b < 2), R = 1, and P = S = 0, where b represents
the temptation to defect.
To explore the role of migration, we resort to the spa-
tial game in which individuals are placed on some spa-
tial structures. Since the combination of spatial struc-
tures into evolutionary games by Nowak and May [15],
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FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperators as a function of the temptation to defect b. (a) Individuals are located on a continuous square
plane (SP) of linear size L = 20 with periodic boundary conditions. Interaction radius q = 1. Filled squares, open circles and
open triangles show results for v = 0, v = 0.04 and v = 1 respectively. Lines are guided for eyes. (b)-(e) Individuals are located
on square lattices (SL), random graphs (RG), small-world networks (SW) and scale-free networks (SF). Average connectivity
z = 4 for SL and SF, z = 6 for RG and SW. Filled squares, open circles and open triangles show results for p = 0, p = 0.001 and
p = 1 respectively. The population size is 1024. The equilibrium fraction of cooperators results from averaging over 105 time
steps after a transient period of 105 time steps. Each data point depicted corresponds to an average over 1,000 simulations;
that is, 100 runs for 10 different realizations of the same class of graph.
there has been much interest in revealing the influence
of population structures on cooperation, ranging from
regular lattices to complex networks [16–30]. In the spa-
tial games, interactions among individuals are restricted
within immediate neighbors and usually neighbors of an
arbitrary individual keep fixed. While in the presence of
migration, neighboring individuals can be changed by en-
countering different partners as time goes on. In the sem-
inal works of Vainstein et al. [10] and Meloni et al. [13],
random migration has been considered in spatial games
on a two-dimensional lattice and on a continuous plane,
respectively. Inspired by these original researches, we ex-
tend migration on regular structure to complex networks
and uncover the general role of migration in promoting
and hampering cooperation.
Let us first consider individuals moving on a contin-
uous square plane (SP) with periodic boundary condi-
tions. Initially, individuals are randomly located on a
square plane and cooperators and defectors with equal
percentage are randomly distributed on the plane. At
each time step, each individual plays the game with in-
dividuals falling in a circle of radius q that centered at
his/her current position. Individuals synchronously up-
date their strategies according to a best-takes-over repro-
duction, that is, each individual compares his/her pay-
off with his/her neighbors and update his/her strategy
by following the one (including himself/herself) with the
greatest payoff. We have examined that the qualitative
results shown below are robust, regardless of detailed up-
dating rules, such as the finite population analogue of the
replicator dynamics [19] and Fermi update rule [31, 32].
After the strategy updating process, individuals move
to new locations with random directions of motion in
migration speed v. The absolute value of v defines the
distance an individual can move in a typical time step.
Simulation results for the fraction of cooperators for dif-
ferent migration speeds are shown in Fig. 1(a). We can
see that compared to the static case (v = 0), coopera-
tion is enhanced in a wide range of temptation to defect
when individuals move slowly (v = 0.04). On the other
hand, fast moving (v = 1) leads to complete extinction
of cooperators, analogous to the situation arising in the
well-mixed population.
Next, we study individuals migrating on various net-
work models, including square lattices (SL), random
graphs (RG) [33], small-world networks (SW) [34] and
scale-free networks (SF) [35]. Initially, each node of the
network is occupied by an individual and individuals
with two strategies (cooperators or defectors) are ran-
domly distributed. At each time step, each individual
plays the game with individuals sitting on the same node
and neighboring nodes. Individuals synchronously up-
date their strategies according to the best-takes-over re-
production and then each individual jumps to a randomly
chosen neighboring node with probability p (a node can
be occupied by more than one individual). Results are
shown in Figs. 1(b)-(e). As compared to the static case
(p = 0), low migration probabilities (e.g. p = 0.001) pro-
mote cooperation in a wide range of the temptation to
defect b (except for large b on square lattices and ran-
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of
the migration speed v or the migration probability p. (a) Indi-
viduals migrate on the square plane (SP) of linear size L = 20.
The temptation to defect b = 1.35 and the interaction radius
q = 1. (b) Individuals migrate on various networks. The
temptation to defect b = 1.5. Average connectivity z = 4
for SL and SF, z = 6 for RG and SW. The population size
is 1024. Each data point depicted corresponds to an aver-
age over 1,000 simulations; that is, 100 runs for 10 different
realizations of the same class of graph.
dom graphs, where the fraction of cooperators is lower
than that of p = 0), similar to the results on the continu-
ous plane. While for high migration probability (p = 1),
defectors dominate the whole population.
From Fig. 1, we can find that by the comparison with
spatial game in the absence of migration, low migration
speeds/probabilities can considerably promote coopera-
tion whereas high migration speed/probability facilitates
defection, which are qualitatively regardless of underly-
ing structures. We have also investigated the dependence
of fraction of cooperators on the migration speed v and
probability p with fixing the value of temptation to de-
fect b. As exhibited in Fig. 2, as v and p increase, the
fraction of cooperation monotonously decreases. It has
been known that in spatial games, cooperators can sur-
vive by forming clusters [31, 36, 37], in which the benefits
of mutual cooperation can outweigh losses against defec-
tors, thus enable cooperation to be maintained. Com-
bining Figs. 1 and 2, we can find that the effect of mi-
gration on cooperation is twofold. For high migration
speed/probability, cooperation is inhibited since cooper-
ator clusters can be hardly formed induced by the fre-
quent change of neighbors. Without the protection of
cluster structures, cooperator can hardly survive. For
the low degree of migration, it is not easy to figure out
the influence of migration to cooperation. A heuristic
explanation is that after the construction of cooperator
clusters, small perturbation along the boundary by mi-
gration can trigger the expansion of cooperator clusters
and enhance the fraction of cooperation.
To intuitively understand the effect of perturbation
around the cooperator cluster on cooperation, we con-
struct a crossed cooperator cluster (including 5 cooper-
ators) surrounded by defectors on a square lattice (see
Fig. 3). The temptation to defect b = 1.4. If individu-
als are immobile, the crossed cooperator cluster is stable
and keeps unchanged. In the presence of migration, sit-
uations arising at the cluster boundary can be classified
into four types: (1) a cooperator at the boundary enters
the defector cluster; (2) a defector at the boundary in-
trudes into the cooperator cluster; (3) a defector moves
away from boundary within its defector cluster and (4)
a cooperator moves away from boundary within its co-
operator cluster. In case (1), the irruptive cooperator
transfers to a defector; In case (2), the irruptive defector
changes to a cooperator; In case (3), nothing happens.
Cases (1) to (3) do not drastically affect fraction of co-
operator in the system (not shown here). However, in
case (4), the territory of the cooperator cluster expands
to other regions of the square lattice and the number of
cooperators increases from 5 to 12, as shown in Fig. 3
[38]. It is thus the rising of case (4) that promotes the
prevalence of cooperation in the population. In general,
this scenario is representative of the strengthening of the
cooperator cluster boundary by multi-cooperators at the
same node (the density of cooperators is augmented along
the boundary). A direct result is that the payoffs of coop-
erators along the boundary are increased and defectors
nearby the boundary will be assimilated. As a result,
cooperator clusters expand and cooperation is enhanced.
To visually observe how low degree of migration af-
fects the evolution of cooperator clusters and defector
clusters, we initially set some cooperators in the middle
region of a square plane, while defectors are located on
other regions. From Figs. 4(a)-(c), one can find that,
for low migration speed, the cooperator cluster gradually
expands as time step t increases and cooperators domi-
nate the whole population in the end. For the static case
in which individuals do not move, the cooperator cluster
keeps almost unchanged [see Fig. 4(d)].
In summary, we have studied the role of random migra-
tion in cooperation in the framework of spatial prisoner’s
dilemma game [39] on a variety of spatial structures. Our
findings are that although high degree of migration by
disabling the formation of cooperator clusters results in
the extinction of cooperation, low degree of migration
4FIG. 3: Red balls represent defectors and blue balls denote cooperators. Each individual plays the game with individuals who
are located on the same lattice and the neighboring lattices. The temptation to defect b = 1.4. After a cooperator moves from
the cluster boundary into the core of cooperator cluster, the cooperator cluster expands.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Snapshots of distributions of cooperators (blue) and defectors (red) on a square plane of linear size
L = 20. Initially we set individuals who are located in the middle region of the plane as cooperators (the cooperative region is
square with size 10× 10), while defectors are located on other regions. The population size is 500, the interaction radius q = 1
and the temptation to defect b = 1.5. (a)-(c) Snapshots at different time steps t for v = 0.1. (a) t = 0, (b) t = 263 and (c)
t = 1315. (d) The snapshot for v = 0 when the system reaches equilibrium.
can considerably enhance cooperation by increasing the
cooperator density along the boundary of the cooperator
cluster. Due to the accumulation of cooperators along
the boundary, the benefits of mutual cooperation out-
weigh losses against defectors nearby the boundary, this
thus not only enables cooperation within the cluster to be
maintained, but also induces the expansion of the coop-
erator cluster, in contrast to the static spatial game. The
strengthening at the boundary of cooperator clusters in-
duced by the small degree of migration plays the key role
in the enhancement of cooperation, regardless of the un-
derlying structure on which the evolutionary game takes
place. Our work may inspire further effort in exploring
the effect of migration behavior on not only game-based
cooperation but also other dynamical processes, such as
epidemic spreading and information routing in ad-hoc
networks.
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